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I.   INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, castration has been used to punish sex of-
fenders.1 By the late 1900s, most castration sentences were disal-
lowed on appeal, and a relieved public lauded itself for living in more
enlightened times.2 However, in Florida, the definition of
“enlightenment” changed when, in 1997, the Florida Legislature
overwhelmingly enacted chapter 97-184, Florida Laws,3 opening the
                                                                                                                   
* Legislative Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union, Tallahassee, Florida.
B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1964; J.D., Vanderbilt University, 1967; LL.M., Southern
Methodist University, 1968. Law Clerk to the Honorable Irving L. Goldberg, United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Dallas, Texas 1967-68. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Joshua A. Munn, Boca Raton, Florida, a second-
year law student at Stanford University and intern for the ACLU of Florida during the
summer of 1997.
1. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Peters, Comment, Chemical Castration: An Alternative to
Incarceration, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 308-09 (1993) (describing the historical uses of cas-
tration).
2. See generally id.; Karl A. Vanderzyl, Comment, Castration as an Alternative to
Incarceration: An Impotent Approach to the Punishment of Sex Offenders, 15 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 107, 109-13 (1994) (describing the eugenics movement of the early twentieth century
in the United States); Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alternative Cases, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1203, 1203-15 (1995) (chronicling the Supreme Court’s treatment of four types of
biological alteration controversies); Connie S. Rosati, A Study of Internal Punishment,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 123, 165-66 (1994) (presenting a philosophical discussion of the effort to
move from voluntary choice to involuntary imposition of drug therapy); Stacy Russell,
Comment, Castration of Repeat Sexual Offenders: An International Comparative Analysis,
19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 425, 438-40 (1997) (discussing the international history and debate
over the use of chemical castration).
3. Act effective Oct. 1, 1997, ch. 97-184, § 1, 1997 Fla. Laws 3455 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 794.0235 (1997)).
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door for “chemical castration”4 of sex offenders. The new statute
mandates court-ordered weekly injections of a sex-drive-reducing
hormone5 to qualified repeat sex offenders upon release from prison.6
It may also be administered to first-time sex offenders.7
Child molesters, rapists, and other sex offenders are perceived as
among the most vile members of society. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the Legislature revived an ancient method of turning these
condemned men into eunuchs. This time, however, the lawmakers
advocated the use of drugs, not the surgeon’s scalpel, to accomplish
their objective.8 While medical advances have made chemical sup-
pression of the sex drive possible as a treatment for some sex offend-
ers, the procedure is not free from criticism by medical, psychologi-
cal, and psychiatric professionals.9 Moreover, some, like the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), believe that court-ordered, man-
datory chemical castration is unconstitutional.10
                                                                                                                   
4. The term “chemical castration” was first used in reference to a punitive measure
for sex offenders in 1982 by the Arizona Supreme Court. See State v. Christopher, 652
P.2d 1031, 1031 (Ariz. 1982) (explaining a probationary treatment alternative recom-
mended by a psychiatrist, but not ordered by the trial court). The media also described the
court-imposed administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) to sex offenders as
“chemical castration.” See Margaret Talev, Reaction Mixed on Chemical Castration,
TAMPA TRIB., June 1, 1997, § 2, at 1.
5. Medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) is a synthetic progesterone more commonly
known as the female contraceptive Depo-Provera, the brand name used by the manufac-
turer, the Upjohn Company. See PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2083 (51st ed., 1997).
6. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997). The statute provides that the court “[s]hall sen-
tence a defendant to be treated with medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), according to a
schedule of administration monitored by the Department of Corrections, if the defendant
is convicted of sexual battery as described in s. 794.011, Florida Statutes.” Id. §
794.0235(1)(b). Notably, the statute holds that “in lieu of treatment with . . . (MPA), the
court may order the defendant to undergo physical castration upon written motion by the
defendant providing the defendant’s intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent to physi-
cal castration as an alternative penalty.” Id.
7. See id. § 794.0235(1)(a).
8. See T. Christian Miller, Chemical Castration for Rapists Gets Committee Okay,
ST. PETE. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1997, at B7; Gordon Russell, Bills Would Allow Chemical Cas-
tration, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Apr. 2, 1997, at A1; see also Kenneth B. Fromson, Com-
ment, Beyond an Eye for an Eye: Castration as an Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 331 (1994) (arguing that castration is a creative sentencing
alternative that is necessary to alleviate the growing sexual offense rate in the United
States). Representative Mark Ogles (Repub., Bradenton), who introduced House Bill 83,
and Senator Anna Cowin (Repub., Leesburg), who sponsored Senate Bill 774, believe that
the new law will greatly decrease the number of repeat sex offenses in Florida. See Miller,
supra; Russell, supra.
9. See Sandra G. Boodman, Does Castration Stop Sex Crimes?: An Old Punishment
Gains New Attention, but Experts Doubt Its Value, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1992, Weekly
Journal of Medicine, Health, Science and Society, at 7.
10. See ACLU OF FLA., ACLU POSITION STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL CASTRATION (on
file with the ACLU of Florida, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter ACLU POSITION STATE-
MENT]; Dana Peck, Chemical Castration Advances: Senate Panel OKs Rape Punishment,
FLA. TIMES-UNION, Mar. 26, 1997, at B3.
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This Article explores whether mandatory chemical castration is a
medically acceptable and constitutionally permissible alternative to
incarceration for sex offenders in Florida. Part II discusses the his-
tory of chemical castration in the United States. Part III addresses
the medical, legal, and ethical issues the new statute raises and dis-
cusses the physical effectiveness of chemical castration on sex of-
fenders. Part IV examines whether the new statute violates several
constitutional rights of the sentenced sex offender, namely the right
to refuse non-consensual medical treatment, the right to privacy, the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the right to due
process and equal protection, and the protection against double jeop-
ardy. Parts V and VI establish that civil libertarians will accept a
probation program that provides voluntary drug treatment for sex of-
fenders if the goal of the program is to treat, and not to punish, the
sex offender.
II.   A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHEMICAL CASTRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
The early twentieth century United States eugenics movement
endorsed both castration and sterilization for many of society’s ills.11
Some states implemented laws requiring castration as punishment
for a variety of infractions.12 However, by the end of World War II,
such practices waned in popularity.13
Recent medical developments have made chemical suppression of
the sex drive through the injection of antiandrogen drugs a viable al-
                                                                                                                   
11. See Vanderzyl, supra note 2, at 109-13.
12. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (striking down an Okla-
homa statute that authorized the sterilization of recidivist criminals). Although Skinner is
often cited as the leading case on sterilization, the Court did not address castration as a
constitutionally impermissible, barbarous punishment. Instead, the Court held that the
Oklahoma law permitting the sterilization of habitual criminals violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state law invidiously discriminated
against the indigent by exempting defendants who had repeatedly been found guilty of
white collar crimes. See id. at 537. However, other courts have held that surgical castra-
tion is cruel and unusual punishment. See State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (S.C. 1985)
(holding that surgical castration is a form of mutilation and, therefore, cruel and unusual
under the South Carolina Constitution); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1914),
rev’d on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917) (striking down an Iowa statute authorizing
vasectomies for repeat felons as violative of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment because vasectomies, like castration, inflict shame, hu-
miliation, degradation, and mental torture on the defendant); Whitten v. State, 47 Ga.
297, 302 (1872) (explaining that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment was intended to prohibit barbaric penal practices, such as quartering, hang-
ing in chains, and castration).
13. See Russell, supra note 2, at 439-40 (noting that knowledge of Nazi experimenta-
tion with castration and sterilization caused the public to disfavor these procedures as a
means to adjust criminal behavior).
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ternative to surgical castration.14 Thus, in 1984 a Michigan judge or-
dered a convicted sex offender to submit to medroxyprogesterone
acetate (MPA) injections as a probationary condition.15 The appellate
court set the sentence aside as a violation of the Michigan probation
statute.16 Nonetheless, in 1996 these medical studies prompted Cali-
fornia to become the first state to enact legislation providing for
chemical castration of certain sex offenders.17 Florida’s Legislature
enacted its chemical castration statute approximately six months af-
ter the California bill was signed into law.18
III.   FLORIDA’S 1997 CHEMICAL CASTRATION STATUTE
The new Florida statute authorizes a trial judge to sentence any
defendant who is convicted of sexual battery to receive MPA.19 If the
defendant is convicted of sexual battery and has a prior conviction
for sexual battery, the trial court is required to impose a sentence of
MPA administration.20 The administration of MPA is, however, con-
tingent upon a determination by a court-appointed medical expert
                                                                                                                   
14.  See William L. Baker, Castration of the Male Sex Offender: A Legally Permissible
Alternative, 30 LOY. L. REV. 377, 379, 386 (1984). In 1966, researchers at the Biosexual
Psychological Clinic of Johns Hopkins Hospital began conducting some of the first phar-
macological studies of chemical castration in the United States. These studies served as a
catalyst for laws providing for the chemical castration of sex offenders in this country. See
William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Position of Rape Offenders: Statutory
and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 5 (1986). California and Louisiana
have chemical castration statutes. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1997); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15.538(C) (West 1997). In addition, in 1996 and 1997, chemical castration
bills were introduced in Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee. See S. 116, 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala.
1997); H.R. 8, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997); H.R. 2216, 43d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1997); H.R.
1133, 61st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1997); S. 215, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997); H.R. 4307, 89th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997); S. 2465, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1997); H.R. 753, 89th Leg., 1st
Reg. Gen. Assembly (Mo. 1997); S. 1568, 207th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 1996); S. 4925,
220th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 1997); H.R. 3672, 69th Leg. Assembly (Or. 1997); H.R. 482,
100th Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1997); H.R. 483, 100th Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1997); H.R.
585, 100th Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1997); S. 1152, 100th Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1997); S.
1153, 100th Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1997).
15. See People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 313 (Mich. Ct. App.), modified, 419
N.W.2d 909 (Mich. 1984), appeal after remand, 394 N.W.2d 437 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986);
Gauntlett v. Kelley, 658 F. Supp. 1483 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (denying the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus), aff’d, 849 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1988).
16. See Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d at 317 (explaining that the administration of MPA to
sexual offenders had not gained acceptance in the medical community as a safe and effec-
tive use for males).
17. See Act of Sept. 17, 1996, ch. 596, § 2, 1996 Cal. Stat. 92 (codified at CAL. PENAL
CODE § 645 (West 1997)); see also Note, Constitutional Law—Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection—California Becomes First State to Require Chemical Castration of Certain Sex Of-
fenders, 110 HARV. L. REV. 799, 799 (1997) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
18. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1997, ch. 97-184, § 1, 1997 Fla. Laws 3455, 3456 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997)).
19. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(1)(a) (1997).
20. See id. § 794.0235(1)(b).
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that the defendant is an appropriate candidate for the weekly drug
injections. Likewise, the continued use of MPA is not required when
a determination is made that it is not medically appropriate.21 The
trial judge must specify the duration of the treatment that, in the
discretion of the court, may be for life.22
The Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) will provide the
services necessary to administer the MPA.23 Once the defendant be-
gins receiving court-ordered MPA injections, the failure to continue
to use the drug, without authorization by the court, is both a viola-
tion of probation and the commission of a separate and distinct sec-
ond degree felony.24 The defendant does, however, have a choice: he
may choose surgical castration in lieu of chemical castration.25
A.   The Wonder Drug: MPA
Florida’s chemical castration statute permits sex offenders to
elect physical castration,26 but it is unlikely that many defendants
will choose this option. Although a number of European countries
have used surgical castration as a punitive measure during the past
century, the procedure has never been regarded with favor in the
United States.27 Most Americans object to the procedure on humani-
tarian and civil liberties grounds such as cruel and unusual punish-
ment.28
MPA, the drug mandated by the Florida Legislature for use in
chemical castrations, is more commonly known as Depo-Provera.29
                                                                                                                   
21. See id. § 794.0235(2)(a). Although the new law does not contemplate that a de-
fendant will receive the MPA treatment until one week prior to his release from prison,
the medical determination of “appropriate candidate for treatment” must be made no later
than 60 days after the imposition of sentence. Id. Thus, the law provides for a medical di-
agnosis that could have a profound impact on an individual’s health to be made, in most
instances, years before the treatment is actually administered. See id. It is difficult to
imagine that any competent health care professional would be willing to testify at an ad-
versarial hearing on her diagnostic report that a defendant will be an “appropriate candi-
date for treatment” at some future date, possibly years in advance.
22. See id. This section of the statute clearly demonstrates the law is punitive, not
therapeutic. Imagine a judge ordering someone to participate in a biological experiment
for an indefinite period of time, to begin at some unspecified future date, based upon a di-
agnosis that as of today, with no guarantees about next month or next year, that individ-
ual is an appropriate candidate for the administration of the drug.
23. See id. § 794.0235(3). The statute does not state whether the physicians who
administer the drug shall be state employees or private physicians operating under an
employment contract. This decision will be made by the DOC. The DOC has the authority
to adopt administrative rules applicable to the statute. See id. § 120.54; id. § 944.09.
24. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(5)(a)-(b).
25. See id. § 794.0235(1)(b).
26. See id.
27. See Douglas J. Besharov & Andrew Vachs, Sex Offenders: Is Castration an Ac-
ceptable Punishment?, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 42, 42.
28. See Peters, supra note 1, at 309.
29. See supra note 5.
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The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) originally approved the
drug for irregular uterine bleeding, threatened miscarriage, and
amenorrhea, or the absence of menstruation.30 Today, it is marketed
world-wide as a female contraceptive.31
The FDA has not approved MPA specifically for use in chemical
castrations.32 Nonetheless, it is not considered an experimental drug
and, therefore, can be prescribed by any physician under the FDA
Guidelines relating to the “use of approved drugs for unlabeled indi-
cations.”33 In men, the drug reduces the production of the hormone
testosterone in the testes and the adrenal glands, and, therefore, re-
duces the level of testosterone circulating through the bloodstream.34
As testosterone levels drop, so does the putative sex drive in most
men.35
MPA has been used successfully with only one type of sex of-
fender, the paraphiliac, who demonstrates a pattern of sexual
arousal, erection, and ejaculation that is accompanied by a distinc-
tive fantasy or its achievement.36 While MPA has proven successful
                                                                                                                   
30. See Green, supra note 14, at 5 n.23.
31. See George R. Huggins & Anne Colston Wentz, Obstetrics and Gynecology, 270
JAMA 234, 235 (1993) (tracing the turbulent history of MPA approval in the United
States). Until 1992 MPA was banned in the United States for use as a female contracep-
tive because of concerns linking the drug to breast and uterine cancer. See id.
32. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual Of-
fender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (1990).
33. Id. at 6. It is important to note that the FDA does not approve of or regulate the
use of MPA for chemical castration. Thus, while it is technically correct for proponents to
claim that the drug is not experimental, those in opposition have a valid argument that
the use of MPA to control the male sex drive is the latest development in a long tradition
of dangerous experimentation by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists with biodeter-
ministic and reductionist views of human sexuality. See Daniel C. Tsang, Policing Perver-
sions: Depo-Provera and John Money’s New Sexual Order, 28 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 397, 402
(1995).
34. See Raymond A. Lombardo, California’s Unconstitutional Punishment for Hei-
nous Crimes: Chemical Castration of Sex Offenders, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2613
(1997); Tsang, supra note 33, at 399. In adult males, studies have proven that the pro-
longed use of MPA can reduce testosterone to the level of a prepubescent boy. See id.
35. See Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 6-7; Fred S. Berlin & Carl F. Meinecke, Treat-
ment of Sex Offenders with Antiandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization, Review of
Treatment Modalities, and Preliminary Findings , 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 601, 603 (1981).
36. See Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 5; Daniel L. Icenogle, Sentencing Male Offenders
to the Use of Biological Treatments: A Constitutional Analysis, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 279, 285,
288-93 (1994). Paraphiliacs include, but are not limited to, people suffering from pedo-
philia, exhibitionism, fetishism, sadism, and other psychosexual disorders, including some
forms of rape. See Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 5. The medical community considers
paraphilia to be a psychiatric syndrome. See Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 35, at 603.
The success of MPA treatment is, according to studies, contingent upon the following
conditions being met: the offender must volunteer for the treatment; the offender must
not have an anti-social personality pathology; the offender must not have a severe sub-
stance abuse problem; the dosage must be sufficient to suppress testosterone production;
and a consenting pair-bonded partner must be available. See Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at
9 (citing Paul A. Walker et al., Antiandrogenic Treatment of the Paraphilias, in
GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS 427, 435 (Harvey C. Stancer et al. eds.,
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for some paraphiliacs, there is considerable scientific opinion that
the drug is not likely to have any meaningful influence on three
other types of sex offenders who come within the purview of the new
statute: defendants who deny the perpetration of the offense; defen-
dants who admit the perpetration of the offense, but who blame their
behavior on non-sexual or non-personal forces, such as drugs, alco-
hol, or job stress; and defendants who are violent and appear to be
prompted by non-sexual factors, such as anger, power, or violence.37
However, the new statute makes no distinction among the four dif-
ferent types of sex offenders.38
B.   The Role of the Medical Expert
The new statute provides that “[a]n order of the court sentencing
a defendant to medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) treatment under
subsection (1), shall be contingent upon a determination by a court-
appointed medical expert, that the defendant is an appropriate can-
didate for treatment.”39
This subsection raises several interesting medical, legal, and
ethical issues regarding who qualifies as a medical expert, who
qualifies as an “appropriate candidate for treatment,” whether the
candidate has the right to be informed of any potential medical risks,
and whether the candidate can rebut the medical expert’s findings
concerning the appropriateness of the “treatment.” How the trial
courts address these issues may hold the key to both the acceptance
of the procedure in Florida by professionals in the applicable fields of
medicine, psychology, and psychiatry, as well as the appellate courts’
determination of the statute’s constitutionality.40
                                                                                                                   
1984)). Further, “the treatment should be accompanied by psychotherapy to help the of-
fender readjust to a new lifestyle.” Id. The treatment has been successful with most
paraphiliacs in controlled situations where hormone therapy was coupled with appropri-
ate counseling. See Icenogle, supra. Recidivism rates were under five percent. See id.
As the bills proceeded through the committee process, the primary sponsors of the legis-
lation, Representative Ogles and Senator Cowin, argued that scientific trials over the past
20 years have conclusively shown that the drug leads to a dramatic decrease in sexual
thoughts and fantasies in most men. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crime & Pun., tape record-
ing of proceedings (Feb. 25, 1997) (on file with comm.) (discussion of HB 83).
37. See Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 4.
38. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997) (sentencing a defendant to MPA injections for a
number of sexual offenses, including pedophilia, committing a sexual battery that causes
serious physical injury, and committing a sexual battery upon a physically or mentally in-
competent person). The Florida law is broader in application than its California counter-
part. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1997) (mandating chemical castration for child
molesters only).
39. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a) (1997).
40. See generally Fred S. Berlin, The Paraphiliac and Depo-Provera: Some Medical,
Ethical and Legal Considerations, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 233, 234-36 (1989)
(advocating the use of MPA as mandatory treatment, but not as punishment, for willing
sex offenders).
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First, does the term “medical expert” include medical doctors,
psychiatrists, and psychologists? Who qualifies as a “medical expert”
may determine who is “an appropriate candidate for treatment.”
Education, experience, and philosophical attitudes toward drug
therapy may play a role in deciding whether an individual is “an ap-
propriate candidate for treatment.”
Second, there is no definition of “appropriate candidate for treat-
ment.” Does the term mean that if the defendant can physically tol-
erate the administration of the drug, its use is mandated by statute?
While the broad language of the new statute suggests this is the
legislative intent, it is questionable whether this is a sound medical
and ethical practice.41
Third, the new statute does not require the court-appointed ex-
pert or the court to advise the defendant of the medical risks in tak-
ing the drug.42 Regrettably, there were few prisoners’ rights advocacy
groups walking the halls of the Florida Capitol demanding that
these defendants be fully informed of the medical risks of undergoing
mandatory chemical castration. The lack of focus on “informed con-
sent” is rather ironic considering the contentious legislative debate
during the 1997 Regular Session43 that led to the enactment of the
Woman’s Right-to-Know Act.44
                                                                                                                   
41. See id. at 236-39; Pamela K. Hicks, Castration of Sexual Offenders: Legal and
Ethical Issues, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 641, 665-66 (1993) (noting opposition from the medical
community on medical and ethical grounds).
42. Of course, there is an ethical and professional obligation for any treating physi-
cian to advise her patient of the risks of a particular treatment. Under the mandated
guidelines of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), every person receiving
medication, whether Medicaid-funded or not, must be informed of the side effects. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(2)(A)(ii)(I)(dd) (1994). Further, under FDA guidelines regarding ex-
perimental drugs or use of drugs, a detailed form must be completed by the patient and
signed and witnessed, before the patient may receive the treatment. See 21 C.F.R. §§
50.20, .27 (1997).
However, the circumstances are somewhat different here. The plain language of the
legislation shows a clear intent to limit the defendant’s choices between chemical or surgi-
cal castration. He may not refuse, if found to be an “appropriate candidate for treatment,”
without severe consequences. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(5)(a)-(b) (1997) (charging a pro-
bationer who refuses or fails to appear at the DOC for MPA treatment with a second de-
gree felony).
43. See Diane Rado, Late Abortion Ban Sent to Gov. Chiles, ST. PETE. TIMES, May 2,
1997, at A1 (highlighting some viewpoints expressed in the debate on the Woman’s Right-
to-Know Act).
44. Act effective July 1, 1997, ch. 97-151, §§ 1-13, 1997 Fla. Laws 2501 (amending
FLA. STAT. ch. 390 (1995 & Supp. 1996) (mandating that certain physicians provide de-
tailed information, including a brochure with graphics, about the risks of terminating a
pregnancy and the alternatives to the procedure).
Of course, there are few prisoners’ rights advocacy groups compared to the numerous
organizations that lobby at the Florida Capitol as part of the right-to-life movement.
Moreover, legislators are aware that pro-life constituents have a strong political voice,
while convicted sex offenders are not only disenfranchised, they are often a despised mi-
nority even within the prison community.
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When used on males, MPA effectively suppresses erections,
ejaculations, and reduces the frequency and intensity of erotic
thoughts.45 Side effects include increased appetite, weight gain of fif-
teen to twenty pounds, fatigue, mental depression, hyperglycemia,
impotence, abnormal sperm, lowered ejaculatory volume, insomnia,
nightmares, dyspnea (difficulty in breathing), hot and cold flashes,
loss of body hair, nausea, leg cramps, irregular gall bladder function,
diverticulitis, aggravation of migraine, hypogonadism, elevation of
the blood pressure, hypertension, phlebitis, diabetic sequelae,
thrombosis (leading to heart attack), and shrinkage of the prostate
and seminal vessels.46
Fourth, the new statute directs the trial judge to have the defen-
dant examined by a medical expert who then reports her findings to
the court.47 Are these findings rebuttable by either the defendant or
the state? May the court reject the testimony of its own witness?
In Specht v. Patterson ,48 the United States Supreme Court found
that the opportunity for indeterminate confinement under a sexual
psychopath statute warranted certain procedural protections.49
Those protections include the right to be heard, to be represented by
an attorney, to present evidence, and to cross examine adverse wit-
nesses.50 The Court did not, however, articulate the standard of proof
to be used in such cases. Nonetheless, because the proceeding is
criminal in nature, the standard of proof employed in evaluating the
testimony of the medical expert should, at a minimum, be clear and
convincing evidence.51
                                                                                                                   
45. See Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 7 (explaining that the drug suppresses sponta-
neous erections but does not cause total sexual impotence); John T. Melella et al., Legal
and Ethical Issues in the Use of Antiandrogens in Treating Sex Offenders, 17 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 223, 225 (1989).
46. See Melella et al., supra note 45; John McD. W. Bradford, The Hormonal Treat-
ment of Sexual Offenders, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 159, 163 (1983).
47. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a) (1997).
48. 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (finding that Colorado’s Sex Offenders Act, which permitted a
court to sentence a sexual offender to an indeterminate sentence not specified in the
criminal statute, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
49. See id. at 608 (explaining that pursuant to Colorado’s Sex Offenders Act, a sex of-
fender would be sentenced based upon a report made by a court-designated psychiatrist
without permitting the defendant an opportunity to rebut the psychiatrist’s findings).
50. See id. at 610.
51. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 12 (explaining Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364 (1986), which held that the introduction of a psychiatric report in a civil com-
mitment proceeding does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination because those safeguards are designed to protect the defendant’s due proc-
ess rights in a criminal proceeding only). In practice, the medical expert is more likely
than not to be the state’s witness, appointed by the court because the expert believes in
the use of MPA for almost all sexual offenders subject to section 794.0235, Florida Stat-
utes, a criminal statute. In such a circumstance, the defendant should be afforded the op-
portunity to rebut the adverse findings of the medical expert. Conversely, if the court se-
lects a medical expert who is not predisposed to the state’s position, the prosecutor should
have the opportunity to present expert testimony expressing a different opinion.
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IV.   CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The new statute raises several constitutional issues, including
possible violations of the right to refuse non-consensual medical
treatment, the right to privacy, the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, due process and equal protection, and double
jeopardy.52
A.   Involuntary Treatment and Informed Consent
The new statute suggests that the Legislature intended to include
a broad range of sex offenders within the purview of the statute.53
However, many doctors believe MPA should be administered to a
more narrowly delineated class of persons.54 According to these doc-
tors, the pivotal criterion in calculating the treatability of any sex of-
fender is the patient’s acknowledgment that his conduct is intoler-
able and beyond his control. 55
Moreover, according to health care professionals who have been at
the forefront of advocating the use of chemical castration as an ef-
fective alternative to incarceration, successful treatment requires
competent psychotherapy and close monitoring in addition to the
administration of MPA.56 Regrettably, neither psychotherapy nor
any other kind of treatment beyond the mandatory, weekly injection
of the drug is mentioned in the new statute.57
It appears that the Legislature, in enacting the chemical castra-
tion statute, has proceeded on the belief, or perhaps more accurately,
on the hope, that administering a single drug—even involuntarily—
can effectively alter abusive behavior in all categories of sexual of-
fenders. However, given the statute’s broad application to the four
types of sexual offenders,58 each with different underlying causes for
their exhibited criminal behavior, and the omission of the critical
element of therapeutic counseling for those forced to undergo the
procedure, it is difficult to conclude that the Legislature seriously
viewed chemical castration as a form of treatment rather than pun-
ishment. To paraphrase the old truism about the duck: if it looks like
                                                                                                                   
52. See ACLU POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 10.
53. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997).
54. See Talev, supra note 4; supra Part III.A.
55. See Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 9.
56. See id.
57. The explanation is probably more fiscal than philosophical. The current cost of an
MPA 400 mg intramuscular injection is $40.00 per week. See Fla. S. Comm. on Crim.
Just., CS for SB 774 (1997) Staff Analysis 7 (Apr. 22, 1997) (on file with comm.). The Leg-
islature did not analyze the cost for psychotherapy. However, it is not unreasonable to
project the cost at several thousand dollars for each individual ordered to undergo weekly
MPA injections.
58. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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punishment, if it operates likes punishment, and if the Legislature
intended for it to be punishment, then it must be punishment.
Obtaining a defendant’s informed, voluntary consent for the ad-
ministration of any drug, particularly one that has never received
FDA sanction for the legislatively mandated purpose, is not only
sound medical practice, it is constitutionally required.59 The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that an individual possesses a liberty
interest that includes the right to withhold consent to intrusive
medical treatment.60 Courts have also held that prisoners and com-
petent patients involuntarily committed to state mental institutions
do not forfeit their fundamental right to refuse non-consensual medi-
cal treatment.61 However, courts have also recognized that in the face
of legitimate prison regulations to preserve prison safety and secu-
rity met by reasonably related procedures, the rights of prisoners
may be limited.62 A court must weigh the prisoner’s decisional
autonomy and bodily integrity interest against the nature of the gov-
ernment’s compelling interest.63
                                                                                                                   
59. See Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 18-25 (discussing informed consent).
60. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990) (holding that an
incompetent person’s wishes to withhold medical treatment must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence); see also Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1993)
(balancing a prisoner’s right to be free from non-consensual intrusions into his bodily in-
tegrity against the countervailing state interests of the preservation of life, prevention of
suicide, integrity of the medical profession, and protection of innocent third parties); Sin-
gletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (recognizing a prisoner’s
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment after he engaged in a hunger strike).
61. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (holding that antipsychotic
medication may be administered to a mentally ill state inmate only after determining that
the inmate was dangerous and that the drug was in the inmate’s best interest); Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 n.16 (1982) (“[I]nvoluntarily committed mental patients do re-
tain liberty interests protected directly by the constitution . . . and these interests are
implicated by the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs.”); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (“A criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish
an individual’s right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do
not authorize the State to . . . subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without af-
fording him additional due process protections.”); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st
Cir. 1980) (“[A] person has a constitutionally protected interest in being left free by the
state to decide for himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medi-
cal treatment . . . as part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, or personal
security.”); Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1974) (performing a hemor-
rhoidectomy without the prisoner’s consent implicated the prisoner’s right to refuse medi-
cal treatment); Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
(recognizing a prisoner’s right to refuse medical treatment after he engaged in a hunger
strike); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1980) (holding that a legally competent pa-
tient has the right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs).
62. See Washington, 494 U.S. at 223 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987)).
But see Singletary, 665 So. 2d at 1105 (applying strict scrutiny analysis and holding that
the prisoner retained the constitutional right to privacy, despite the state’s interest in the
preservation of prison security, safety, and rehabilitation).
63. See Washington, 494 U.S. at 229 (recognizing a significant liberty interest in
avoiding the unwanted administration of an antipsychotic drug); Thor, 855 P.2d at 383
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In Canterbury v. Spence ,64 the court stated that “[t]he root prem-
ise [to the doctrine of informed consent] is the concept, fundamental
in American jurisprudence, that ‘[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body.’”65 The question thus becomes whether court-ordered
chemical castration of a defendant at the time of his release from
confinement, as required by the new statute, is voluntary.
Chemical castration is an intrusive and invasive procedure with
many known side effects and long-term health risks.66 Mandatory
weekly drug injections qualify as an unjustified interference of a de-
fendant’s constitutionally protected rights, absent a demonstrated
showing of a “compelling state interest.”67 Protecting society from
recidivist child molesters and rapists is unquestionably a compelling
governmental interest. Nonetheless, given the paucity of evidence
that chemical castration is an effective means of treatment for non-
paraphiliacs and involuntarily-treated paraphiliacs, mandatory
administration of MPA is not reasonably related or narrowly tailored
to the state’s legitimate goals of rehabilitation and public safety.
Proponents of chemical castration emphasize that because the of-
fender can choose, at least in theory, to not submit to the procedure,
the medical treatment is consensual.68 But the choice to discontinue
the administration of MPA can result not only in a violation of pro-
bation, but also in an indictment for an additional second degree fel-
ony.69 Consequently, exercising the option to withdraw from the
medical treatment, without the consent of the court, is no option at
all. Given this reality, the choice cannot be held to be made freely,
knowingly, or voluntarily.
B.   The Right to Privacy
Unlike article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, the U.S.
Constitution does not provide an explicit right to privacy. The U.S.
Supreme Court has, however, acknowledged an implied right to pri-
                                                                                                                   
(upholding an inmate’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); see also Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down a forced sterilization statute).
64. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing a patient-initiated action against a sur-
geon).
65. Id. at 780.
66. See supra text accompanying note 46.
67. See generally Green, supra note 14, at 17.
68. See Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 22 (arguing that if the defendant is permitted
the option of accepting the treatment as a condition of probation or parole, then it is vol-
untary because there has been a rational decision to undergo treatment rather than re-
main in prison).
69. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(5)(a)-(b) (1997).
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vacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.70 This fundamental guaran-
tee protects an individual’s decisional autonomy and right to bodily
integrity with respect to decisions concerning childbearing and con-
traception.71
State-mandated administration of an impotence-inducing hor-
mone not only involves compelled medical care, but also invades the
constitutionally protected right to privacy. Like forced sterilization
and contraception, an order directing periodic injections of MPA
implicates the rights of bodily integrity and reproductive autonomy.72
In Skinner v. Oklahoma ,73 the Court acknowledged that the right to
procreate represents one of the basic civil rights of humanity and
that such a right is fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race.74
The Court has expressed “great resistance to expand the sub-
stantive reach of [the Due Process Clause], particularly if it requires
redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.”75 In
this effort, the Court has rendered precise requirements for those
rights that should be protected, insisting “not merely that the inter-
est denominated as a ‘liberty’ be ‘fundamental’ . . . but also that it be
an interest traditionally protected by our society.”76 Yet, a finding by
the courts that procreation is fundamental did not unduly jeopardize
the reach of the Due Process Clause because “[t]he rights to conceive
and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential’ . . . ‘basic
civil rights of man’ . . . and ‘[r]ights far more precious . . . than prop-
erty rights.’”77
                                                                                                                   
70. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (holding that a state law
forbidding the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional because the statute intruded
upon the right of marital privacy and was not supported by a compelling state interest).
When a statute infringes on a fundamental right or appears to invidiously discriminate
against a suspect class, the court applies a strict scrutiny analysis, requiring that the ac-
tion be justified by a compelling state interest, and that it be the least restrictive means
for achieving the state’s asserted goal. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
2268 (1997) (upholding a statutory ban on assisted suicide).
71. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1978) (recognizing that
the constitutional privacy protection implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment extends to
individual childbearing decisions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)
(holding that the privacy right encompasses the right of unmarried persons to use contra-
ception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing
the privacy right as encompassing the freedom from bodily restraint and compulsion, the
liberty of caring for one’s own health and person, and the freedom to decide fundamental
issues of one’s life, such as procreation and child-rearing).
72. See Peters, supra note 1, at 322-23 (discussing the right to procreative freedom).
73. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
74. See id. at 541.
75. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (upholding a sodomy statute).
76. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (footnote omitted) (upholding a
California statute establishing paternity).
77. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that an unwed father was
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children could be removed in a
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The Court in Paul v. Davis78 recognized that legislation infringing
on the right of procreation invokes a heightened constitutional
analysis.79 Chemical castration as a punitive measure for convicted
sex offenders violates the right of procreative freedom. To render a
convicted sex offender virtually impotent is to deprive him of his
right to procreate, a right characterized in cases such as Skinner as
“one of the basic civil rights of man.”80 In addition, castration by pe-
riodic injections represents a more intrusive procedure than a vasec-
tomy because it results in a diminution of the sex drive. While pro-
ponents of the new statute argue that the chemical castration proce-
dure involves only a temporary interference with an individual’s
ability to reproduce, the individual’s ability to procreate is still in-
fringed upon during the period of treatment. Moreover, the new
statute provides courts with the authority to order that the injec-
tions be administered for life.81
C.   Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Techniques outside the scope of traditional penalties, such as
fines and incarceration, are constitutionally suspect.82 Courts have
invalidated several medical treatments as cruel and unusual pun-
ishment and view with particular disfavor experimental, peculiar,
and ineffective “therapies.”83 In Skinner, Justice Jackson wrote,
“[t]here are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented
majority may conduct biological experiments at the expense of the
dignity and personality and natural powers of a minority—even
those who have been guilty of what the majority define as crimes.”84
                                                                                                                   
dependency proceeding) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)).
78. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Court clarified the scope of privacy deserving constitu-
tional protection and held that without more, damage to reputation alone does not impli-
cate a fundamental liberty interest. See id. at 713.
79. See id. at 713.
80. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
81. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a) (1997). Given the current levels of concern about
sexual predators, the author believes that a sentence of weekly drug injections “for life”
will be the norm, rather than the exception, should the new law be held constitutional.
82. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (holding that the expatriation of a
U.S. Army deserter exceeded Congress’ war power).
83. See Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 1973) (disallowing the ad-
ministration of a vomit-inducing drug to nonconsenting mental institution inmates);
Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that a prisoner chal-
lenging the use of a fright drug as aversive therapy had sufficiently alleged a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D. N.J. 1978)
(finding that the forcible administration of psychotropic medication was a treatment plan
and not punishment because the medication had therapeutic value, was recognized as an
acceptable medical practice, did not cause unnecessarily harsh side effects, and was part
of a continuing psychotherapeutic program).
84. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring).
1998]                         CHEMICAL CASTRATION 131
In reasoning that echoes a cruel and unusual punishment analy-
sis, the court in People v. Gauntlett 85 struck down a sentence com-
pelling a man convicted of a sexual offense to submit to MPA injec-
tions as an unlawful condition of probation and unauthorized by
state law because MPA had not received FDA approval specifically
for chemical castrations, and had not gained acceptance in the medi-
cal community as a safe and effective treatment for males.86 While
chemical castration has yet to be analyzed pursuant to the federal
Constitution, courts have held surgical castration to be violative of
the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment. In holding that a fine for assault and battery was
within the sentencing parameters established by a Georgia statute,
the court in Whitten v. State87 explained that quartering, burning,
hanging in chains, and castration are cruel and unusual punish-
ments.88 In Davis v. Berry,89 the court struck down an Iowa statute
that authorized vasectomies for repeat felons as cruel and unusual
punishment, and as violative of both equal protection and due proc-
ess.90 The court distinguished vasectomy from surgical castration,
but reasoned that the two procedures induced similar effects on the
defendant.91 Vasectomy, like castration, was held to be cruel and un-
usual punishment because “the humiliation, degradation, and men-
tal suffering are always present and known.”92
D.   Due Process and Equal Protection
Although courts maintain great discretion in imposing terms of
probation, all probationary conditions must meet the requirements
of the reasonable relationship test.93 Probationary conditions must
be reasonably related to the crime for which the offender was con-
victed, to the rehabilitation of the offender in order to prevent future
                                                                                                                   
85. 352 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984), modified, 419 N.W.2d 909 (Mich. 1984),
appeal after remand, 394 N.W.2d 437 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Gauntlett v. Kelley, 658 F.
Supp. 1483 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus), aff’d, 849
F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1988).
86. See Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d at 315-17. The Gauntlett court explained it was not
deciding the case on constitutional grounds because the case could be decided pursuant to
state law. See id. at 314.
87. 47 Ga. 297 (1872).
88. See id. at 302.
89. 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev’d on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917).
90. See id. at 416.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 416-17.
93. See United States v. Stine, 521 F. Supp. 808, 809 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff’d, 675 F.2d
69 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that a condition of probation requiring convicted felons to sub-
mit to psychiatric counseling satisfied the reasonable relationship test).
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criminality, or to the promotion of public safety.94 The imposed con-
dition may not be overbroad in its application.95 The condition must
also be narrowly tailored to meet the goal of rehabilitation “without
unnecessarily restricting the probationer’s otherwise lawful activi-
ties.”96
Chemical castration fails both prongs of the reasonable relation-
ship test with regard to non-paraphiliacs and involuntarily-treated
paraphiliacs. First, those who assert that the government’s interest
in protecting the public is met by removing an offender’s ability to
commit future sex crimes fail to recognize that continued incarcera-
tion is a more narrowly tailored means of furthering the state inter-
est than chemical castration. Second, because the non-paraphiliac’s
conduct is often motivated by anger and hatred rather than sexual
desire, a treatment that merely curbs sexual desire bears no reason-
able relationship to the offender’s criminal behavior.97 Third, appli-
cation of chemical castration to all repeat offenders violates the re-
quirement that a condition of probation not be overbroad. Because
chemical castration is an ineffective treatment for non-paraphiliacs,
it cannot meet its intended goal in this class of sex offenders where
the purpose of probation is to rehabilitate.98 Fourth, the statute
strips the courts of any discretion to make an individual determina-
tion of the suitability of MPA treatment for repeat sexual offenders.
                                                                                                                   
94. See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) (affirming the con-
dition that the probationer not participate in any political activities because the restric-
tion was reasonably related to his conviction of illegally accepting campaign contribu-
tions); Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the proba-
tionary conditions requiring the forfeiture of assets and charitable work were not intended
as rehabilitative); M.C.L. v. State, 682 So. 2d 1209, 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (upholding
the moral probation requirement because it was reasonably related to the crime); Fer-
nandez v. State, 677 So. 2d 332, 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (invalidating a probation re-
quirement that the defendant submit to and pay for random alcohol tests); Howland v.
State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding a condition of probation prohib-
iting a convicted child abuser from fathering a child invalid because it interfered with
noncriminal conduct and was not reasonably related to past or future criminality).
95. See Hughes v. State, 667 So. 2d 910, 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (striking down as
overbroad a probationary condition that forbid the defendant from coming within 250
miles of the victim); Williams v. State, 661 So. 2d 59, 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (invalidating
a probationary condition that the defendant waive confidentiality of random blood and
urine tests because it was overbroad); People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th 362, 371 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (invalidating a condition of probation that the defendant not become pregnant
because it was not reasonably related to the crime committed or to future criminal behav-
ior).
96. Higdon, 627 F.2d at 898; see also Brodus v. State, 449 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1984) (invalidating the condition prohibiting a drug user from living with an unre-
lated female); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (invalidating a con-
dition prohibiting a convicted child abuser from marrying or becoming pregnant).
97. See Russell, supra note 2, at 426-59; Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 4-5; Icenogle,
supra note 36, at 285, 288-93.
98. See Komisky v. State, 330 So. 2d 800, 801-02 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (finding that
the purpose of probation is primarily to rehabilitate, not to punish).
1998]                         CHEMICAL CASTRATION 133
Periodic, indefinite injections are mandated for repeat sex offenders,
regardless of how dangerous the drug may be and whether the pro-
cedure offers any effective treatment.99 The statute’s mandate is
particularly inappropriate for a sentence that requires the ingestion
of a drug that may be totally ineffective and may inflict serious side
effects.100 Fifth, chemical castration does not necessarily prevent fu-
ture criminality because the treatment does not address the of-
fender’s violent tendencies and thus does not curb an offender’s urge
to commit acts of sexual battery. In fact, some experts fear that
chemical castration will, because of the shame it instills, augment
the violent nature of some offenders.101 Moreover, because non-
paraphiliac offenders are motivated not by sexual drive, but by in-
tense feelings of hatred and hostility, the procedure may cause an
increase in the occurrences of this type of sexual battery.102
Finally, there is the issue of gender. On its face, the statute is
gender neutral. The consequences, however, are not. Both males and
females who commit sexual battery are theoretically subject to the
statute. MPA was designed to be used by women as a safe contra-
ceptive. It has no effect on the female sex drive.103 In contrast, MPA
has been legislatively mandated for use in a biological experiment
designed to curb the sex drive of men convicted of sexual battery.
The long-term physical and psychological effects of the administra-
tion of the drug are unknown.104
In sum, the diagnosis of the cause of a particular sexual battery is
difficult and requires a comprehensive evaluation of the driving
forces behind the behavior as well as the emotional responses to the
behavior.105 The new statute does not take into account the com-
plexities of the causes of sexual battery. Instead, it provides the
court with a single solution—the involuntary injection of drugs into
                                                                                                                   
99. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(1)(b) (1997).
100. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (allowing antipsychotic
medication to be administered only after a determination that an inmate is dangerous and
that the drug is in the inmate’s best medical interest); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-
94 (1980) (“A criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individual’s
right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do not authorize
the State . . . to subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him
additional due process protections.”). The author does not doubt that some prosecutors
and some trial judges will read section 794.0235, Florida Statutes, to require “the weekly
administration of injections of MPA for the natural life of the defendant” based upon the
finding of a “medical expert” who has never treated a sex offender with MPA. The “expert”
will likely predict that the defendant will not have an allergic reaction to MPA nor will he
experience any unanticipated side effects.
101. See Vanderzyl, supra note 2, at 133.
102. See id.
103. See Harvard Note, supra note 17, at 803.
104. See Fitzgerald, supra note 32, at 9.
105. See Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 35, at 601.
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the body of a defendant over an extended period of time—which is
highly problematic and perhaps dangerous.
E.   Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and article
1, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provide that no person shall
be subject for the same offense “twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.”106 These provisions protect against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction or acquittal, and multiple punish-
ments for the same offense.107
In State v. Woodland ,108 the court held that the prosecution for
violation of probation and contempt would subject the defendant to
double jeopardy.109 Because the defendant’s violation of probation
would result in sanctions or revocation of probation, double jeopardy
attaches and the state cannot also charge the defendant with a sepa-
rate felony. This is distinguishable, however, from a violation of pro-
bation that would constitute a crime whether it is committed by a
probationer or not.
Under the new law, submission to MPA treatment is a condition
of probation for repeat sexual offenders, and can be a condition of
probation for first-time offenders.110 Should a defendant decide to
withdraw from the administration of MPA, he will be guilty of a vio-
lation of probation.111 In sentencing a defendant for violation of pro-
bation, a judge may not impose a subsequent sentence that exceeds
the sentence he or she might have originally imposed.112 Failure to
comply with medical treatment is not a criminal act except as a vio-
lation of probation.113 Thus, double jeopardy prohibits the state from
charging a defendant who withdraws from treatment with a crime
other than violation of probation.
The new statute, however, attempts to circumvent these problems
by classifying this specific violation of probation—failure to submit
to MPA treatment—as a separate and distinct second-degree felony.
                                                                                                                   
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. See Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 246 (1981) (holding that a criminal ap-
peal by the prosecution is permissible when such an appeal is permitted by federal stat-
ute); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (finding that a trial court divided a charge
into separate parts, resulting in multiple convictions and subjecting a defendant to double
jeopardy); Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1994) (holding that a modification
of probation that has a punitive effect is double jeopardy).
108. 602 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
109. See id. at 555.
110. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997).
111. See id. § 794.0235(5)(a)-(b).
112. See Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla. 1988).
113. See Green v. State, 463 So. 2d 1139, 1139 (Fla. 1985) (holding that the state can
try the probationer for a crime that triggered probation revocation proceedings, even
though there was insufficient evidence to revoke the probation).
1998]                         CHEMICAL CASTRATION 135
If valid, this provision will permit the court to sentence the offender
to serve the remainder of his sentence for sexual battery, as well as
an additional fifteen years as provided in section 775.082, Florida
Statutes, for terminating the drug treatment. 114
The purpose of the federal and state prohibitions against double
jeopardy is to prevent the government, with all its resources and
power, from making repeated attempts to convict or punish an indi-
vidual for an “alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity.”115 It should be equally impermissible
for the Florida Legislature to circumvent this constitutional princi-
ple by criminalizing the decision to withdraw from medical treat-
ment. Because failure to submit to medical treatment is not inher-
ently a criminal activity, as opposed to proactively committing a rob-
bery while on probation, the courts should view this legislative at-
tempt to avoid the application of the double jeopardy clauses as sus-
pect.
V.   A CIVIL LIBERTIES ANALYSIS
Civil libertarians assert three positions on the use of MPA as an
alternative to incarceration in sex offender cases. First, the use of
drugs on sex offenders is impermissible per se.116 This position rests
on the notion that the use of behavioral drugs unduly intrudes on
the personality of the individual in violation of the First Amend-
ment117 and could amount to cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. Second, the use of drugs as a condition of
probation is impermissible because it is involuntary and coerced.118
This approach rejects the argument that an individual, with in-
formed consent, can rationally and permissibly choose drugs over in-
carceration.
                                                                                                                   
114. See FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(c) (1997).
115. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
116. See Memorandum from the Due Process Committee to the ACLU Board of Direc-
tors (Mar. 28, 1991) (on file with the ACLU of Florida, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter Due
Process Memo].
117. MPA effectively suppresses the paraphiliac’s erotic fantasies. See Berlin &
Meinecke, supra note 35, at 603. In this way, one could argue, the drug interferes with the
paraphiliac’s thought processes. See Melella et al., supra note 45, at 227. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has held that the state has no right to control an individual’s thoughts even
if they are immoral. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) (“Whatever the
power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to public immorality, it
cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s pri-
vate thoughts.”). In Rogers v. Orkin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), the court enjoined
doctors from forcibly medicating patients in a mental institution because the capacity to
think and decide unencumbered by the state is a fundamental right. See id. at 1366-67.
118. See Due Process Memo, supra note 116.
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Third, as a procedure of “last resort,” treatment administered in
conjunction with psychotherapy can be a permissible alternative to
incarceration.119 Few civil libertarians would assert a per se position
against the use of behavioral drugs if the prescribed treatment is
medically proven to be safe with reversible side effects. However,
civil libertarians are unable to enthusiastically embrace the idea of
drug therapy on defendants for fear that the use of drugs to protect
the public safety will supersede other legitimate concerns, such as
the rehabilitation of the defendant. In addition, a systematic bias in
favor of drug therapy can lead to overuse and misjudgment about
who receives treatment. If placed in the wrong hands and under the
wrong conditions, supposedly therapeutic treatment could victimize
rather than benefit patients, much like a “Clockwork Orange” sce-
nario.120
However, the critical issue in this debate is whether the use of
MPA is part of a program of punishment or part of a program of
treatment.121 If treatment is the goal, civil libertarians are willing to
countenance a program, provided the drugs are safe and the proce-
dural requirements for assuring voluntary participation in the
treatment are met. Where punishment is the goal, civil libertarians
categorically oppose the use of behavioral drugs. Consequently, it is
not surprising the ACLU of Florida opposed the enactment of chap-
ter 97-184, Florida Laws.122
VI.   A MORE RATIONAL APPROACH: THE ACLU OF FLORIDA POLICY
ON THE USE OF ANTIANDROGEN DRUGS IN SEX OFFENDER CASES
When the state seeks to rehabilitate an offender through drug
therapy, serious civil liberties concerns arise. The ACLU of Florida
opposes forcible medication in any context because administration of
behavior-modifying drugs by the state is open to far-reaching
abuse.123 Individuals have the right to make autonomous decisions
                                                                                                                   
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See supra Part IV.C.
122. See ACLU POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 10.
123. Subsequent to the announcement by Governor Chiles that he would allow House
Bill 83 to become law without his signature, the ACLU of Florida state legal panel re-
quested authorization to file a constitutional challenge to the new law, based upon the
principles set forth in this policy statement. The request was approved by the ACLU Af-
filiate Board of Directors at its spring meeting in West Palm Beach, Florida, on May 17,
1997. The ACLU cannot challenge the statute until someone who committed a sex offense
on or after October 1, 1997, is sentenced under the statute. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235
(1997). Much of the language of the policy statement was adapted from the Report of the
National ACLU Due Process Committee, dated September 24, 1993. The Due Process
Committee studied the use of antiandrogen drugs as an alternative to incarceration in sex
offender cases for over three years. However, the National ACLU Board of Directors was
not able to reach a consensus as to a specific policy on the issue.
1998]                         CHEMICAL CASTRATION 137
about the use of any drug that might affect their cognitive or physi-
cal functions, which includes the right to refuse unwanted medica-
tions.
Even the consensual use of a drug does not eliminate all civil lib-
erties concerns. Consent given in the context of a choice between in-
carceration and non-incarceration may not be fully voluntary. Addi-
tionally, drugs, even when consensually taken, pose a risk of cogni-
tive or physical side effects, not all of which may be known to the
individual at the time of choice. The ACLU of Florida opposes any
attempt to coerce an individual into taking the drug. The ACLU of
Florida also opposes the failure to advise the individual fully of the
legal and medical consequences of taking the drug. Furthermore, the
ACLU of Florida opposes any attempt to offer a defendant the oppor-
tunity to avoid incarceration by taking a drug that is dangerous or
that has a significant irreversible effect on an individual’s cognitive
capacity or an important physical function, such as the ability to
conceive children.124
The ACLU of Florida does not oppose the use of antiandrogen
drugs under certain controlled circumstances as an alternative to in-
carceration for convicted sex offenders. Because the ACLU of Florida
respects individual autonomy and supports the principle that pun-
ishment should be no more restrictive of liberty than necessary, an
individual’s choice of whether to accept an antiandrogen drug is en-
titled to considerable respect. In addition, because this choice arises
in the inherently coercive context of sentencing, and because of the
capacity for abuse of this sentencing option, such treatment should
be available only under the most carefully controlled circumstances.
The following are procedures that the ACLU of Florida would re-
quire in a probationary drug treatment program for sentenced sex of-
fenders. A psychologist or psychiatrist must certify that the defen-
dant’s sexual disorder is one that may be treated effectively with the
drug. Drug treatment may be used in lieu of incarceration only when
the use does not pose significant health risks to the defendant. The
drug must not be experimental and must be customarily prescribed
by the medical community for this use. Moreover, the effects of the
drug must be reversible when treatment ceases. Finally, the drug
must be used in conjunction with appropriate psychotherapy.
The defendant must consent to the treatment program after con-
sultation with counsel. To ensure that the defendant’s consent is in-
formed, the alternative incarceration sentence should be devised
without regard to available drug treatment and in accordance with
normal sentencing practices. The defendant should have a consulta-
tion with appropriate medical professionals informing him of the ef-
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fects the drug will have on him, including possible long- and short-
term side effects, and the proposed course of psychotherapy. If the
defendant cannot afford the consultation, the state should bear the
cost.
At sentencing, the court must ask the defendant on the record if
he fully understands the treatment and whether he has been pro-
vided with all necessary information. The court must inform the de-
fendant of the sentence the court will impose if the defendant does
not undertake drug treatment, and the maximum length of the al-
ternative probationary term. Finally, the court must inform the de-
fendant that he may withdraw from treatment at any time and re-
turn to the court for sentencing. If the defendant does not wish to
undertake the treatment, the court may not order it.
If the defendant begins treatment and subsequently decides to
withdraw, the court should not automatically impose the sentence of
incarceration announced at the original sentencing. Instead, the
court should consider the defendant’s reasons for withdrawing from
treatment along with any other possible mitigating information. In
addition, the court may not impose a longer sentence of incarceration
than the sentence announced at the original sentencing hearing.
VII.   CONCLUSION
The reasoning advanced for the enactment of Florida’s chemical
castration statute is that rehabilitation of sex offenders and the
safety of Florida’s citizens are sufficient justifications for establish-
ing chemical castration as a condition of release for convicted sex of-
fenders.125 In response, the medical experts, whom the Legislature
chose to ignore, maintained that rehabilitation and reduction in re-
cidivism can only occur when the drug addresses the specific behav-
ioral abnormality of the particular sex offender, the treatment is
voluntary and not coerced, the individual genuinely wants to address
his aberrant behavior, and there is extensive therapeutic counseling
and monitoring of the individual.126
How can Floridians be safe and secure if the court-ordered drug
treatment is administered to those whose motivation is not sex, but
rather violence, hatred, and control, on the mistaken belief that it is
likely to have a measurable impact on the root causes of the defen-
dant’s criminal behavior? How can Floridians have confidence in a
legislative enactment, adopted under the guise of rehabilitation, that
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mandates a medical practice that is condemned as experimental and
even irresponsible by medical authorities?127
One of the nation’s leading authorities on MPA, Dr. Fred Berlin,
founder of the Biosexual Psychological Clinic at the John Hopkins
Hospital, believes that prevailing research demonstrates that MPA
will drastically reduce the rate of recidivism, or reversion to criminal
behavior, of some sex offenders after they are released from prison.128
Most medical experts agree that, under proper conditions, the drug
can be an effective rehabilitative tool for a narrow category of sex of-
fenders.129 Consequently, there is no reason to propose an absolute
ban on the use of antiandrogen drugs, like MPA, as an alternative to
incarceration for some convicted sex offenders. We can, however, do
far better than Florida’s new chemical castration statute.
The Florida Legislature, in its haste to address a serious societal
problem, has enacted a statute that not only ignores sound medical
judgment, but is in all probability unconstitutional. One cannot
simply provide trial judges with the authority to direct individuals to
have chemicals injected into their bodies on a weekly basis for per-
haps the rest of their lives without more thought than is evidenced
in this legislation. In any other context, the action of the Florida
Legislature would be deemed practicing medicine without a license.
                                                                                                                   
127. See id. Absent a more proven and effective treatment for the causes of acts of
sexual battery, incarceration will always provide greater protection to the public because
it removes the offender from society. Chemical castration, improperly prescribed, allows
the offender greater access to potential victims without eliminating the hostility and rage
that precipitates most criminal sexual conduct. In addition, chemical castration subjects
an offender to immediate, potentially adverse physiological effects and significant future
health risks. Since continued incarceration does not expose a convicted sex offender to
these varied risks, it constitutes a less restrictive means of dealing with sex offenders.
128. See Fred S. Berlin, The Case for Castration, Part 2, Wash. Monthly, May 1994, at
28, 29.
129. See supra note 36.
